compiler was added to speed up the performance of the execution of bytecodes. Currently, BPF 66 can be loaded for its execution into kernel with different tools to execute different tasks, such as 67 system monitoring (trough using perf tool), network traffic control and quality of service (through 68 tc tool), and packet filtering (through ip link tool included in iproute2 suite or iptables). 69 Due to its flexibility, BPF has been used by important technology companies such as Google, 70 Facebook, Cloudflare and Netflix to address network security issues, load-balancing, traffic-71 filtering and monitoring [11]-[14]. A comparison of the filtering performance achieved by a BPF-72 based filter (BPFilter), iptables and nftables has also been provided in other studies [11] , [15] 73 showing that BPFilter runs up to 5 times faster than iptables. This scenario led to the consideration 74 of BPF as a reliable candidate to replace iptables (and nftables) as the kernel firewall subsystem 75 for Linux [11] . However, despite the fact that BPF syntax is more powerful than that offered by 76 current Linux firewalls, BPFilter only takes advantage of the BPF virtual machine to speed up 77 rules created by older tools. Majkowski [16], [17] demonstrated how to take advantage of BPF in 78 conjunction with iptables to filter packages and define new chains. These works allowed system 79 administrators to take advantage of the rich syntax and efficient execution of BPF expressions to 80 filter packages in real environments and protect IoT devices against malware and vulnerability 81 exploiting.
The first GNU/Linux firewall generation was included on 1.1 kernel through an implementation 144 of ipfw functionalities contributed by Alan Cox [40] . The ipfwadm user-space tool was used to 145 configure the ipfw services offered by the kernel [41] . These kernels allowed defining three 146 different firewall filters to handle (i) input packets (-I ipfwadm argument), (ii) output packets (-O) 147 and (iii) forwarded packets (-F, used in conjunction with ip_forwarding feature). Accept, deny 148 (discard the packet) and reject actions were used either for rules (-a command parameter) or as 149 default policy (-p) . In order to create and design the trigger condition of each rule, the system 150 administrator can test for the protocol (TCP, UDP, ICMP or IP), the port (for TCP and UDP) or 151 the ICMP type. Logging is supported through the -o modifier. 152 The support for ipfw was replaced by ipchains in the 2.2 version of the kernel [42] . One of the 153 most important changes in the ipchains scheme was the introduction of chains to help reduce the 154 computational cost and facilitate its design [43] . As opposed to the others, ipchains firewalls 155 include INPUT, OUTPUT and FORWARD chains, which bring together filtering rules applied to 156 packets where the current computer is the destination, the origin or a router for the packet 157 respectively. Each firewall chain is composed of a ruleset and a default policy. The default policy 158 is applied to packets that do not match any rule. The existence of default policies allows defining 159 firewalls using two different schemes: (i) accept all except those packets explicitly denied or (ii) 160 deny all except those packets explicitly accepted. Of these, the latter is advisable for security 161 reasons. 
175
Iptables have been widely used to implement packet filters on Linux for many years [45] . 176 However, some limitations of iptables, such as the existence of a unique action for a rule or the 177 complexity of the syntax, led to the creation of other filtering frameworks. Hence, nftables 178 emerged as an iptables replacement on kernel version 3.13 (2013) [44] . Nftables included a 179 completely new and fresh syntax that avoided the need to use hyphens and the uppercase/lowercase 180 flags. The use of nftables allows tables and chains to be created with specific names and associated 181 with hooks, thus avoiding the strict tables/chains structure defined by iptables.
182
Despite the new functionalities of nftables, most Linux users continue using the old iptables 183 framework, in part due to the numerous changes in the syntax which hindered adoption. Some 184 translation utilities were introduced to aid in the migration from iptables to nftables [46] . In 185 addition, nftables work as a sequential filter whereby every packet is matched one by one against 186 a list of rules. The speed of checking the rules is quite limited (up to three times slower than using 187 BPF) [11] , which led to the emergence of bpfilter as a new Linux firewalling subsystem [47] able 188 to outperform the speed of previous filtering alternatives [11] . Bpfilter has been added 189 experimentally to Linux Kernel 3.18, now allowing nftables and iptables rules to be executed by 190 Linux kernel as BPF. [50] but are often too slow to be included in standard firewalls. In order to provide a deep 197 description of packets on the firewall layer and quickly evaluate them, the use of BPF language 198 together with the BPF virtual machine subsystem included in the current versions of Linux kernel 199 seems to be an elegant solution, especially as BPF had been used before to accomplish similar 200 difficult network tasks with low computational effort [11] .
201
Despite its performance and low computational costs, developing a BPF-based firewall able to 202 exploit full packet data (headers and payload) is a hard task that would require both the existence 203 of tools to aid in the development of conditions, and packet datasets. Caploader [51] and 204 Wireshark/tcpdump [7] , which can also be integrated with NDPI [52], are capable of loading and As we can deduct from Figure 1 , the design of a firewall rule with Filter.tlk comprises three stages 223 that are made with different tools included in the package. We begin by taking advantage of the 224 BDAT (BPF Design Aid Tool) to design a filtering condition to detect a certain kind of packet.
225
The designed BPF filters can then be tested with different packet sets (a set of packets matching 226 the pcap filter and others mismatching the pcap filter) using BPF Testing tool (BTT). BTT is able 227 to easily assess the quality of an input filter by using different datasets. Once BPF rules have been 228 tested, they can be easily transformed into iptables rules using IPTables Rule Builder (IPTRB) 229 script.
230
BDAT is responsible for creating BPF filters as conditions defined from transport and network 231 layers (see Figure 1 ). By using BDAT through a simple graphical interface, we can create a As depicted in Figure 2a , we selected the first four octets from TCP payload for comparison 241 purposes. BDAT allows selecting one, two or four octets from each word (32bits) to check the 242 condition. The next step of the wizard (see Figure 2b ) allows to easily define the value using 243 Hexadecimal, ASCII or Decimal notations. In order to compare any octet from payload (and 244 options/padding), the offset value (highlighted in red in Figure 2a ) can be edited to the desired 245 value. Please note that the designed condition is provided as example and should be complemented 246 with a "header length" value of five to ensure the absence of options/padding field. In the next step 247 of the wizard, the current BPF condition rule is added to the whole BPF filter, allowing the 248 generation of filters comprising multiple tests.
249
BTT is a plugin for Wireshark that applies a filter or set of filters over a pcap file. As a result, we 
Deployment of generated filters 283
To take advantage of expressions (iptables rules and BPF) generated using our BPF framework, 284 we consider two different scenarios: (i) IoT devices using a GNU Linux-based software/firmware 285 (ii) and other IoT devices with no BPF/iptables support. In the first scenario, iptables rules can be 286 directly integrated into the firmware to protect them against malicious attacks. We are working on 287 the development of a service to share BPFs together with a tool able to automatically download 288 and upgrade BPFs for different IoT devices.
289
Although GNU/Linux is present in some devices, there are many appliances running other 
295
The main weakness of using BPF filters to protect devices against attacks is that we are unable to 296 protect 802.11-based (WLAN, Wireless Local Area Network) IoT devices that do not run 297 GNU/Linux.
298
Next section presents a comprehensive practical example describing the process of using the 
Experiments

302
In this section, we test the filter designed to detect and filter attacks using two vulnerabilities in 311 In order to generate high quality BPF expressions that describe the pattern of a vulnerability 312 exploitation, the use of a large packet database for testing purposes is advisable. Fortunately, many 313 publicly available packet datasets can be freely downloaded from the Internet. Table 1 From the datasets included in Table 1 and other sources, we built up a group of packets that would 317 be used to ensure that inoffensive network requests are not captured by the designed BPF 318 expression. 319 We decided to study and generate BPF filters for two vulnerabilities of well-known IoT devices.
Configuring the working environment
320
In order to determine the quality of the BPF expressions created using a BTT Lua script, we used 321 as negative samples the conjunction of all packets from sources introduced in Table 1 second generated iptables rule allows for storing security information that can be uploaded to a 349 centralized repository for its further analysis. In next section, we evaluate the performance impact 350 on the IoT devices when using these filters. The results compiled in Table 4 show that the performance impact when using BPF filters is quite 365 limited and will not severely affect the overall operation of IoT devices. We analyzed the impact 366 of progressively adding BPF rules to the filter by adding up to 100 new rules and measured the 367 transfer rate after each BPF expression was added (see Figure 3 ). As long as the performance is 368 highly influenced by the presence of additional traffic in network and other processes consuming 369 CPU, we plotted a trend line to observe the degradation. 
